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Differentiated Product Markets
An Experimental Test of Two Equilibrium Concepts∗
Ronald Peeters† Martin Strobel†
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Abstract
In markets with differentiated products Bertrand-Nash equilibria in pure strategies may
not exist. Mixed strategies are difficult to calculate. For these cases Morgan and Shy
(2000) suggest an alternative solution concept, the undercut-proof equilibrium (UPE).
While the Nash-equilibrium is motivated by the question of how ones own behavior influ-
ences one’s payoff, the UPE is motivated by the question of how others’ behavior influence
one’s payoff. We report on an experiment where we test these two concepts with respect
to their comparative statics. Moreover we investigate the nature of subjects’ underlying
thinking process. Our results provide strong evidence against the UPE and in favor of
Bertrand-Nash.
JEL Classification Codes: D43, D01, C91
Keywords: Differentiated Markets, Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium, Undercut-Proof Equilibrium,
Experiment
1 Introduction
The Bertrand model with horizontally differentiated products is one of the simplest models
of industrial organization. Firms produce products that differ from each other for example
in form, color or location of provision. Consumers’ preferences are heterogeneous and favor
either one or the other product. Already Hotelling (1929, p.44) argued that differentiation
serves as a barrier which protects a firm’s “limited monopoly”. Consider the market for books
telling a particular novel as an example. Publisher A sells an English version of the novel
while publisher B sells a Dutch version. In the standard Bertrand setting where language is
not an issue (i.e. all consumers speak both languages), consumers simply go for the cheaper
book. The consequences for the publishers’ pricing decisions are quite harsh. If one firm is
∗We thank Sabine Kröger, Wieland Müller, Jan Potters, Bettina Rockenbach, Martin Sefton, Markus
Walzl and seminar and conference participants in Erfurt, Marseille (Games 2004) and Maastricht (SING 2005)
for helpful comments as well as Saskia Schawo for excellent assistance during the experiments. Financing by
METEOR (Maastricht research school of Economics of TEchnology and ORganizations) and NWO is gratefully
acknowledged.
†Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
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slightly more expensive it will face zero demand and consequently will not earn any profits. If
however the consumers consist of native English and native Dutch speakers who like to read
books in their mother tongue, then the consequences of being more expensive are softened
because some Dutch speakers will buy the Dutch version despite a higher price. How well
the protection of the language barrier functions, depends on the consumer characteristics. In
the example above the publisher of the English version is probably much better protected
because the number of native English speakers being able to speak Dutch or willing to learn
Dutch is supposedly very small while this is not true vice versa.
Despite the simplicity of the Bertrand model with differentiated products the solution
might get quite complicated. For certain consumer characteristics it can be shown that an
equilibrium in pure prices does not exist (see section 2.1 for a detailed explanation). While
the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium is guaranteed, such an equilibrium is difficult to
interpret and only of limited use for application to real-life markets. Consequently some major
contributions to this topic dealt with sufficient conditions of the existence of an equilibrium
in pure strategies. Bester (1992) showed that a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in pure pricing
strategies exists when consumer tastes are sufficiently dispersed. Uniqueness is guaranteed
under further restrictions on the dispersion of preferences.
But what happens if consumer characteristics are such that an equilibrium in pure prices
does not exist? This is an important question because consumer characteristics are in reality
exogenously given. They cannot be chosen conveniently.
Shilony (1977) analyzed a simple model were two firms produce two differentiated prod-
ucts. Each product is preferred by one consumer who has some additional cost (or disutility)
if he buys the product of the other firm rather than his favorite. Shilony showed that there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium and derived a closed-form solution for it. The solution,
however applies only to the case of a completely symmetric market with zero production cost.
In order to find a more intuitive solution, Morgan and Shy (2000) proposed the Undercut-
Proof Equilibrium (UPE). The basic rationale of the UPE is different from the one of a Nash
equilibrium. In verifying an equilibrium, players do not keep their opponents’ strategies fixed
and reason whether there is an incentive to deviate from a given strategy. Rather players
keep their own strategy fixed and reason whether the opponents have an incentive to undercut
(asking a price low enough to attract the complete demand). Although the rationale is not
exactly the same as Stackelberg’s model it shares some of its features, mainly the idea of a
sequential price setting process. Players consider themselves as first movers with the others
being able to react on their price. The big advantage of the UPE is that a unique solution in
pure strategies always exists. Moreover it is easy to calculate (see Shy 2001).
The downside of the UPE is that it comes with two non-intuitive results with respect to
the comparative statics. First, the equilibrium price of a firm depends more heavily on the
production cost of the other firm than on the own production cost. This means that given
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a sufficiently dispersed bimodal and symmetric distribution in consumer characteristics, the
firm with the higher production cost charges the lower price. This is in contrast to the
relationship of the expected prices in the mixed Nash-equilibrium. A second consequence of
the UPE (less unexpected) is that the firm which is favored by a larger number of consumers
charges a lower price because it is more vulnerable to undercutting. This is again in contrast
to the expected prices of the Nash equilibrium. Shy (2001, p.311) argues that the UPE result
is closer to reality than the contradicting result of Bertrand-Nash. There remains, however,
the question of causality. Is the price low because there are a lot of consumers or are there a
lot of consumers because the price is low?
Summing up, Morgan and Shy (2000) provide a nice, reasonable equilibrium concept which
has the advantages of existence and uniqueness but comes with some questionable properties
in the comparative statics. In contrast the mixed Nash equilibrium is quite difficult to derive,
but its comparative statics seems to be more intuitive. This situation calls for an experimental
test of these different solution concepts.1
Besides the pure test of the adequacy of the different concepts there is also an interesting
behavioral point of view: The experimental results should shed some light in general on the
question, which behavioral paradigm, that of Nash or the UPE is closer to people’s ways
to make a decision. The Nash paradigm could be described as thinking how your strategy
changes might affect your payoff while the UPE paradigm is about how others’ behavior would
influence your payoff.
In this paper we set out to investigate these questions. We conducted a experiment with
208 subjects in 15 sessions. We find that our data is much more in favor of Nash than in
favor of UPE. Firms with higher production costs and firms with a larger consumer base do
set a higher prices. Moreover we find some evidence that people think more along the Nash
paradigm than along the UPE paradigm.
In the remainder of the paper we will specify the model in Section 2 and discuss the
different solution concepts. In the following Sections 3 and 4 we report on the experimental
design and the results, respectively. Section 5 concludes with a summary of results and some
suggestions of the appropriateness of the different equilibrium concepts.
2 The Basic Model
All important points we are going to make in this paper are covered by the duopoly case.
Hence we restrict the model and the analysis to it. In our story we have chosen location as the
mode of differentiation. The model, however, applies to any kind of differentiation. Trans-
portation costs represent disutility (switching-costs) for consuming a less preferred product.
1Bertrand competition in differentiated product markets has been experimentally studied to some extent in
the past, see for example Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2000) and Kübler and Müller (2002) and references
therein. All of these studies used a setup with a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Assume two different firms A and B who are located in two different cities correspondingly
labeled A and B. The two firms offer the same product. They have a constant unit production
cost of cA and cB, respectively. There are nA consumers located in city A and nB consumers
in city B. All consumers demand one unit of the product and attach a value of β to it.
We assume β to be sufficiently high to ensure that all consumers will buy in equilibrium.
Consumers may buy the product in their own city and pay the local firm’s price or they travel
to the other city and pay the price of the other firm and an additional fixed transportation
cost equal of δ. All market parameters are assumed to be common knowledge.
The game played consists of two stages where in the first stage the firms simultaneously
and independently set their prices and in the second stage the consumers decide from which
firm to buy or not to buy at all after having observed both prices. This model is solved by
backwards induction.
Stage 2 (consumers’ decision)
The utility functions of the city A consumers and city B consumers can formally be described
as
Ui =





β − pi if consumer i buys from firm i,
β − pj − δ if consumer i buys from firm j,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where i, j ∈ {A, B} and i 6= j.
Consumers maximize their utility which is the benefit they get from the good minus the
cost to acquire it. Ties which may happen for the case of indifferent consumers are broken
as to maximize welfare. This means that indifferent consumers buy rather than abstain and
buy their own firm’s product rather than the other firm’s product. Once the two prices are
announced, the amount of customers for each firm is computed by
qi =





0 if pj + δ < pi or β < pi,
ni + nj if pi < pj − δ and pi < β − δ,
ni otherwise,
(2)
where i, j ∈ {A, B} and i 6= j.
Stage 1 (firms’ pricing decision)
In this stage the two firms simultaneously and independently have to set prices while having
common knowledge about the market parameters. In the following sections we analyze Stage
1 with respect to different solution concepts. Section 2.1 shows that there is no Bertrand-Nash
pricing equilibrium in pure strategies. Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 report on the mixed strategy
equilibrium, the undercut-proof equilibrium and their comparative statics, respectively.
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2.1 Nonexistence of Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
In general there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies for the price competition between
these two firms because of the presence of a price cycle (see for example Edgeworth (1925)
and Maskin and Tirole (1988)). Figure 1 depicts the area of all possible price combinations.
A first thing to note is that firms will never set prices below unit costs and not above the
consumers’ maximum willingness to pay. Setting a price pi > β leads to zero profits which
will not be the case for some p′i ≤ β. Pricing below cost does also result in zero or even
negative profits. We can therefore concentrate on the area [cA, β] × [cB, β].
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Figure 1: A price cycle a la Edgeworth.
Consider the pair of prices (pA, pB) indicated by point a in the figure. In this situation,
both firms can increase profits by increasing their price (given the price set by the other) as
long as the firms stay within the area confined by the restriction |pA − pB| ≤ δ (the area
within the diagonal lines in the figure. Once prices are sufficiently high (indicated by point
b), both players have an incentive to undercut the other because the increase in demand
outweighs the loss in price.2 This brings us to the two triangular areas with points c and
d. Suppose we are in point c. Firm A serves the complete market while firm B suffers from
zero demand. Firm B can increase its profit by moving its the price below the diagonal line,
thereby gaining nB consumers. A symmetric argument holds for d. Clearly, there is no point
that is stable against unilateral deviation, and therefore a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in pure
price strategies does not exist.
2Here we require that the willingness to pay of the consumers is sufficiently high relative to production cost
ci and transportation cost δ.
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2.2 Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
Although a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in pure price strategies does not exist, an equilibrium
in mixed strategies is known to exist. The model has first been tackled by Shilony (1977).
He derived a solution for the case of n firms, β = 1, and ci = 0 and proved that it is the only
symmetric solution. For the “simple” case of two firms the cumulative distribution of prices
reduces to
F (p) =















0 for 0 ≤ p < V − δ,
1 − V
p+δ
for V − δ ≤ p < p − δ,
1 − V
p
for p − δ ≤ p < V ,
2 − V
p−δ for V ≤ p < p,
1 for p ≤ p,
(3)
where V is the value of the game depending on δ
V =
{
(1 +
√
2)δ for 0 ≤ δ < 1
2+
√
2
,
δ+
√
4δ+δ2
2
for 1
2+
√
2
,≤ δ < 1
2
(4)
and p is the highest charged price
p =
{
V + δ for 0 ≤ δ < 1
2+
√
2
,
1 for 1
2+
√
2
< δ.
(5)
For δ ≥ 1
2
, F degenerates to a pure strategy at p = 1.
Since we also deal with asymmetric settings and non-zero production costs, we cannot
make use of Shilony’s results. Therefore we use the software-package Gambit3 to calculate
the limiting logit equilibria of our setups. Motivated by human subjects’ imperfectly opti-
mizing behavior in experiments, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) proposed the quantal response
equilibrium (QRE) in which players choose their strategies stochastically. Actions that in-
duce higher expected payoffs are chosen with higher probabilities. In this way, the QRE
specifies the choice probabilities of sub-optimal strategies, or equivalently the likelihood of
each possible deviation. In its applications, the noise in players’ strategy choices follows a
specific distribution, the logit distribution that allows the degree of noisiness to be repre-
sented by only one parameter. The resulting QRE is called a logit equilibrium and exists for
all parameter values of noise. It generically converges to a unique Nash equilibrium —called
the Limiting Logit Equilibrium (LLE)— as the noise approaches zero (see McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995)). Structurally the LLE in our setups is comparable to the equilibrium found
by Shilony. See Figure 3 for the cumulative distributions of the mixed equilibria of the used
parameter settings.
3http://econweb.tamu.edu/gambit
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2.3 Undercut-Proof Equilibrium
In order to overcome the problem of nonexistence of a solution in pure price strategies, Morgan
and Shy (2000) introduced the undercut-proof equilibrium concept. Although the concept has
been introduced more generally, we restrict our digression to the case of two firms because
this suffices to demonstrate our concerns. Before we define the undercut-proof equilibrium
for the model we have to give a precise definition of undercutting.
Undercutting: A firm is said to undercut the other firm if the firm sets its price low
enough to attract the opponent’s consumers despite the additional transportation costs the
opponent’s consumers face. Formally, firm i undercuts firm j if pi < pj − δ.
Undercut-proof equilibrium: In an undercut-proof equilibrium, each firm chooses its
price so as to maximize its profit while ensuring that its price is sufficiently low that any rival
firm would not undercut. Formally, an undercut-proof equilibrium in our duopoly model is a
pair of prices (pA, pB) satisfying the following conditions for i, j ∈ {A, B} and i 6= j:
(a) For given pj and qj , firm i chooses the highest price pi subject to
πj = (pj − cj)qj ≥ (pi − δ − cj)(ni + nj) (6)
(the price pi maximizes firm i’s profit, and firm j cannot increase profit by undercutting).
(b) The quantities qj depend on prices pj and pi according to equation (2) at the beginning
of the section.
In order to simplify the search for an equilibrium Morgan and Shy (2000) take two further
assumptions.
Assumption 1 (participation): All consumers will acquire the product. This assumption
is satisfied for a sufficiently high willingness to pay of the consumers. It puts some restrictions
on the model’s parameters.
Assumption 2 (multi-product solution): Each firm will sell to its own consumer base.
This assumption is satisfied when the difference between the prices does not exceed the
transportation cost, and again puts some restrictions on the model’s parameters.
Owing to the participation assumption, equation (2) simplifies to
qi =





0 if pi > pj + δ,
ni if pj − δ ≤ pi ≤ pj + δ,
ni + nj if pi < pj − δ.
(7)
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Owing to the multi-product solution assumption, the quantities in inequalities (6) can be
substituted by the consumer bases: qi = ni. Moreover, the profit-maximizing prices given
the undercutting conditions in inequalities (6) are the prices such that the inequalities bind.
Hence, the undercut-proof equilibrium (pA, pB) satisfies
(pj − cj)nj = (pi − δ − cj)(ni + nj) (8)
for i, j ∈ {A, B} and i 6= j. The system of two linear equations with two unknown variables
solves for
pi = cj +
n2j
n2i + ninj + n
2
j
(ci − cj) + 2δ +
ni(nj − ni)
n2i + ninj + n
2
j
δ. (9)
The prices given by equations (9) behave in some non-intuitive way. In order to illustrate
this we will consider three simplified cases.
Case 1 (completely symmetric): We assume that costs as well as the consumer bases
are equal, i.e. cA = cB = c and nA = nB = n. The resulting UPE prices are
pi = c + 2δ. (10)
Case 2 (asymmetric costs): We assume only consumer bases to be equal, i.e. nA = nB =
n. The resulting UPE prices are
pi =
1
3
ci +
2
3
cj + 2δ. (11)
It is interesting to see that given equal consumer bases i’s price depends more on her oppo-
nent’s cost than on her own cost. The intuition is that opponents with higher costs mean a
lower threat to be undercut. Hence i can set a rather high price.
Case 3 (asymmetric consumer bases): We assume only costs to be equal, i.e. cA =
cB = c. The resulting UPE prices are
pi = c + 2δ +
ni(nj − ni)
n2i + ninj + n
2
j
δ. (12)
We see that, given equal costs, the firm with the larger consumer base sets a lower price. The
intuition is that a larger consumer base makes it very attractive for the opponent to undercut.
To prevent this the firm with the large consumer base has to set a rather low price.
2.4 Comparative Statics of LLE and UPE
Both solution concepts described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 do follow their particular rationale.
In the LLE firms focus on the maximization of the own payoff given the opponents’ play.
This can be considered as first order consideration. Players in the UPE look one step further
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because they take a potential reaction of the opponent into account. Moreover their paradigm
is in a way defensive because maximization only takes place as long as the opponent does
not have an incentive to move to an undercutting strategy. We see this as second order
consideration.
The different paradigms lead to opposite comparative statics results in the asymmetric
settings. The LLE predicts that the firm with the lower cost and the firm with the smaller
consumer base set lower prices (see Figure 3). The intuition behind that is that for both
respective types of firms it is very attractive to undercut the opponent. In the asymmetric
cost case the low cost firm will not suffer too much from the low price because its marginal win
is still substantial. In the asymmetric consumer base case the firm with the small consumer
base can gain a lot by undercutting. Analogous considerations lead to the LLE prediction
that the firm with the high cost and with the large consumer base, respectively, set high
prices.
This qualitative prediction of the LLE is in contrast to UPE. There because of the second
order considerations the firm with the lower cost and the firm with the smaller consumer
base will set the higher price. In the asymmetric cost case this behavior is motivated by
the opponent’s limited possibility to undercut. In the asymmetric consumer base case the
opponent finds it not attractive to increase its consumer base only marginally by undercutting
while losing quite something due to the low price.
It would be exaggerated to expect that behavior of human subjects in an experiment would
exactly match any theory with a point prediction because there are too many unmeasured
influences. It can be expected however, that if behavior follows a certain theory then the
comparative statics of this behavior should be consistent with the comparative statics of the
theory. This is, what the following experiment was set out for.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was set up following the model described in Section 2. Two duopolists had
to set prices simultaneously. Consumers were simulated by the computer, that means that
they maximized their utility. Depending on the prices, their transportation costs and their
willingness to pay they either bought from firm A, firm B, or did not buy at all.
For every session 14 subjects were invited to the laboratory. Half of them were randomly
assigned to be firm A. The other half were assigned to be firm B. All market parameters
were common knowledge (the size of consumer bases nA, nB, the individual production costs
cA, cB, the maximum willingness to pay β, and the transportation cost δ).
4
4In order to avoid confusion among the subjects and to put them into the same setting, the instructions and
the computer screens did not talk about firm A’s and B’s parameters but only about the “own” parameters
and the “other” firm’s parameters.
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The model resembles a one-shot game. However, we also wanted to investigate mature
behavior and thus conducted 20 rounds. This was common knowledge. For each round
firms A were randomly matched to firms B. They did not learn whom they interacted with
and whom they were going to interact with. The individual parameters and the market
parameters remained stable throughout this 20 rounds. The feedback which was given to
the firms comprised their price, the other’s price, the resulting individual consumer demands
and the individual profits. Additionally we provided each subject with his (and only his)
accumulated profit.
In order to test the comparative statics of both, the UPE as well as the LLE, we conducted
three different treatments, one complete symmetric, one with symmetric consumer bases but
asymmetric costs and one with symmetric costs but asymmetric consumer bases. Table 1
shows the particular parameter settings as well as the corresponding UPE prices and the
expected LLE prices.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
completely asymmetric asymmetric
symmetric cost consumer base
basic utility β 100 100 100
transportation cost δ 20 20 20
consumer base nA 60 60 80
nB 60 60 40
production cost cA 30 15 30
cB 30 45 30
UPE predictions pA 70 75 65
pB 70 65 74
LLE predictions pA 81.86 74.62 77.96
pB 81.86 82.80 74.32
conducted sessions 5 5 5
total number of subjects 68 70 70
Table 1: Conducted treatments with the predictions of the undercut-proof equilibrium (UPE)
and the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (LLE). Note: The exact values for the UPE
prediction using continuous prices are pA = 64.29 and pB = 72.86. Through the discretization,
however, equilibrium prices shift slightly upwards. LLE predictions are expected prices.
To assist them in making their decisions, subjects could use a profit calculator which was
built into the experimental software. Subjects could enter hypothetical prices for their own
and the other firm and received the resulting potential profits of both firms as information.
3.2 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was computerized and conducted in the experimental computer laboratory
at the University of Maastricht (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration). The
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software was programmed within the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher 1999). Subjects were in-
vited via email to register for a “market experiment” on a website. In total we conducted
15 sessions with 14 subjects each (208 subjects in total).5 In each session subjects received
written instructions (see the appendix for the instructions of the symmetric treatment). They
could study the instructions at their own pace and ask clarifying questions privately. Before
the experiment started every subject had to answer some control questions correctly (see
appendix). After the experiment subjects received a short questionnaire with demographic
questions and eventually they were paid off in cash. For the conversion of ECU (Experimental
Currency Units) to Euro we used different exchange rates for different firm types and treat-
ments. We did this because we wanted to eliminate fairness concerns as much as possible.
Getting the long or the short end in the quite asymmetric treatments might lead people to
feel sorry or envious with the other type of firms. To avoid this problems we had to keep
subjects uncertain about the amount of real money others get. Since subjects could infer
the profits from prices and demands, the only way is to conceal the exchange rate. Each
subject knew only his or her own personal exchange rate. Additionally, everyone received the
explicit information that the exchange rate of others might differ from their own, but none
was informed about the actual exchange rate of others. Doing so means that we give both
equilibrium concepts a good shot. The exchange rates were calibrated by the UPE prediction
(i.e. if all subjects had played the UPE strategy everybody would have received the same
amount of money. The average payoff of a subjects was e 15.- with a session lasting for about
90 minutes.
4 Results
In order to give the reader a general intuition about the data we present some aggregated
results first. Figure 2 shows the development of the average prices over time. Average prices
start quite closely together within the interval [61,67]6 and rise during rounds while also
getting more dispersed across types.
From this first overview it becomes already clear that the data is more consistent with
the LLE prediction rather than with the UPE prediction. For Treatment 2 with asymmetric
production costs the firm with higher production cost is also setting a higher price. For
Treatment 3 with asymmetric consumer bases the firm with a higher consumer base is also
charging a higher price. Furthermore, average prices do increase during rounds and arguably
come close to the respective average LLE prices. How well the LLE prediction is doing in
explaining the results is demonstrated by Figure 3. It shows that the cumulative distributions
of the prices in the last five rounds per treatment and firm type matches the LLE prediction
5For one session in the symmetric treatment only 12 subjects showed up.
6Initial average behavior seems to be close to 65 which is the average price if everyone played exactly the
middle of one’s strategy set.
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Figure 2: Average prices per round (for treatments 2 and 3 the solid dots correspond to firm
A and the circles to firm B).
quite closely and much better than the UPE prediction. Although prices are slightly lower
than the LLE prediction, the structure of the cumulative distributions look very similar.7
In the following subsections we will analyze the data in more detail and provide statistical
tests for our results.
7The logit equilibrium with infinite noise will lead to a uniform distribution over prices. As the data is in
between the two extreme logit equilibria (with infinite and zero noise, respectively), there exist parameters of
noise that lead to an even better fit. This indicates that the shifts towards lower prices can be explained by
the presence of bounded rationality.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of prices in the last five rounds (circles) versus LLE pre-
diction (solid dots) and UPE prediction (dashed line).
4.1 Prices
In order to test the result that prices on average are consistent with the comparative statics
of the LLE rather than the one of UPE we calculate the average price per subject. Using a
Mann-Whitney U test we do not find a significant difference between average prices of firms
A and B in Treatment 1. For Treatments 2 and 3 we find that firms with higher costs and
firms with higher consumer base do set significantly higher prices (see Table 2).
Strictly speaking the average prices are not independent across subjects, since subjects
interacted for 20 rounds and no perfect stranger matching could be conducted.8 In order
to be on the safe side we also calculated the average prices per session and firm type and
conducted Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the session level (see Table 2). The results of the
previous tests were confirmed although at lower significance levels.
Eventually we repeated the tests with only taking into account the last five rounds in
order to investigate the more mature behavior. The results become a bit weaker (see Table
8However, each subject did not know whom he/she was matched to, neither ex-ante nor ex-post.
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Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
completely asymmetric asymmetric
symmetric cost consumer base
UPE predictions pA = pB pA > pB pA < pB
LLE predictions pA = pB pA < pB pA > pB
all rounds
average price pA 71.62 70.80 71.13
pB 73.14 76.96 66.16
Mann-Whitney U n.s. p= 0.009 p< 0.001
Wilcoxon signed-rank n.s. p= 0.031 p= 0.031
last 5 rounds
average price pA 75.15 71.68 73.97
pB 76.95 79.06 68.73
Mann-Whitney U n.s. p= 0.005 p= 0.010
Wilcoxon signed-rank n.s. p= 0.063 p= 0.063
Table 2: Average prices per treatment and player’s type. Mann-Whitney U tests are based
on the average prices of subjects as independent observation. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
are based on sessions as independent observations. Tests are two-sided for Treatment 1 and
one-sided for Treatments 2 and 3.
2, bottom part). Nevertheless we may summarize the findings in the observation that prices
oppose the comparative statics prediction of the UPE and are in line with the comparative
statics prediction of the LLE.
4.2 Undercutting Behavior
While undercutting does per definition not occur in the UPE it might happen in the LLE. It
is therefore interesting to look at the undercutting behavior in particular for the asymmetric
treatments and to compare it with the actual behavior. Table 3 shows the relative frequencies
of cases where undercutting took place.
Following the LLE prediction, in the asymmetric treatments undercutting should be more
frequent with low-cost firms and with the high consumer base firms, respectively. Table 3
shows that this is indeed the case. Applying a Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the basis of
sessions as independent observations the results are found to be significant in Treatments 2
and 3.
4.3 Use of Profit Calculator
As mentioned in Section 3.1 subjects had the possibility to calculate their own and their
opponent’s profit by submitting hypothetical prices to a profit calculator. This data was
recorded. Though there was no other incentive to use it than the value of the information
subjects got from it, the data provides some insight into the reasoning process. The aggregate
14
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
completely asymmetric asymmetric
symmetric cost consumer base
UPE prediction
Pr(pA ≪ pB) 0% 0% 0%
Pr(pB ≪ pA) 0% 0% 0%
LLE prediction
Pr(pA ≪ pB) 9.9% 25.4% 3.8%
Pr(pB ≪ pA) 9.9% 2.3% 17.4%
data all rounds
Pr(pA ≪ pB) 14.1% 21.4% 5.7%
Pr(pB ≪ pA) 10.1% 6.1% 20.7%
Wilcoxon signed-rank n.s. p= 0.031 p= 0.031
data last 5 rounds
Pr(pA ≪ pB) 16.5% 24.6% 7.4%
Pr(pB ≪ pA) 9.4% 5.1% 23.4%
Wilcoxon signed-rank n.s. p= 0.031 p= 0.031
Table 3: Undercutting behavior across treatments. Pr(pA ≪ pB) and Pr(pB ≪ pA) denote
the probabilities of A undercutting B and vice versa. Note: Tests are two -sided for Treatment
1 and one-sided for the Treatments 2 and 3. They are based on sessions as independent
observations. The null-hypotheses are that the frequencies are equal for Treatment 1 and
that their relationship is opposite to the LLE prediction in Treatments 2 and 3.
pattern of usage is as one typically expects from such a tool. We can see a drop in usage
during rounds (from an average of about 5 times in round 1 to roughly 3 times in rounds 8 to
10 and eventually to about 2 times in rounds 16 to 20). 51.4% of the subjects used the profit
calculator only 0 to 50 times in total, 34.3% used it between 51 and 100 times, 8.6% between
101 and 150 times, 3.6% between 151 and 200 times and 2.1% used it more than 200 times.
We classify the usage of the profit calculator into two different behaviors, UPE behavior and
Nash behavior.9
UPE behavior: The typical process to find a UPE strategy (without using sophisticated
analysis) is to assume a price for oneself, and then check whether the opponent has
an incentive to undercut. Depending on that the assumed price can be increased or
decreased and undercutting incentives of the opponent could be checked anew. This
process should therefore result in more frequent changes of the others price than in the
own price.
Nash behavior: The typical (non-sophisticated) process underlying Nash is characterized
by the idea of finding a best response. Given an expectation of the opponent’s price
9We call it Nash behavior, because it is not only characteristic for LLE but for any sort of Nash equilibrium.
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one tries to find the best response to it. Nash behavior should therefore result in more
frequent changes of the own price than of the other’s price.
Two consecutive requests to the profit calculator could either differ by a change in the own
hypothetical price, in the other hypothetical price, or in both.10 In order to categorize subjects
into UPE and Nash types we count and compare the frequencies of the corresponding price
changes. A higher number of changes in the own hypothetical price correspond to a Nash
type. A higher number of changes in the others hypothetical price corresponds to an UPE
type.
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot where each subject is characterized by the changes. Points
below the diagonal represent Nash types because they change their own price more often.
Correspondingly, points above the diagonal represent UPE types. The analysis resulted in
122 Nash types, 68 UPE types and 15 neither Nash nor UPE.11
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Figure 4: Classification into Nash types and UPE types (x-axis: changes in own price; y-axis:
changes in other price).
4.4 Adaptation Behavior
Nash behavior is based on the idea of finding a best response to the other players’ behavior.
To do so, a player has to make up beliefs about others’ actions. For the following analysis
we start out from the simple assumption that players i believe their opponents to play the
10A change was recorded as soon as the subject pressed the “CALCULATE” button of the software anew.
113 subjects were not classifiable since their use of the profit calculator was not sufficiently frequent to have
at least one change.
16
same strategy as in the round before (ptj = p
t−1
j , i 6= j).12 The best response to this belief is
either to maximize the price while keeping the own consumer base or to maximize demand by
undercutting. The first strategy requires one to set the current price pti = p
t−1
j +δ = p
t−1
j +20.
The second strategy requires one to set pti = p
t−1
j − δ − ε = pt−1j − 21.
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Figure 5: Changes in prices from round t − 1 to t dependent on the difference between firms
prices in round t − 1.
Figure 5 shows how players changed their price (pti − pt−1i ) dependent on the difference
between their and their opponents’ price (pt−1i −pt−1j ). Although the data looks quite dispersed
there is some structure to be recognized. First, there exists quite a number of cases in which
players did not change their price (cases located on the x-axis). Second, one can recognize
two imaginary downwards sloping lines, the first from coordinates (−20, 40) to (40,−20) and
the second from (−20, 0) to (0,−20). The first line represents the price maximizing strategy.
Subjects do raise their prices but only as much as to prevent being undercut. The second
line represents demand maximizing, i.e. undercutting. Subjects change their prices in order
to get δ + 1 below the opponent.
12Although subjects were informed that their opponent will be randomly determined from round to round
the results will show that this assumption is plausible.
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4.5 Individual Behavior
A mixed strategy equilibrium in games with random matching may be interpreted in two
different ways. One possibility is that subjects do indeed mix their strategy and play different
actions across rounds. On the other hand there is no need of doing so. Given that subjects are
randomly matched with others they might also play consistently one particular action. This
“mass-action” interpretation of the mixed strategy equilibrium as a steady state in a large
population has already been mentioned in the dissertation of Nash (1950). Our data allows
us to shed some light on this question. Each subject played 20 rounds and thus gives us a
distribution of 20 actions which can be tested against the theoretical distribution of the LLE
predictions. Table 4 shows that we can reject the hypothesis that subjects mix individually
according to the LLE for 145 out of 208 subjects at conventional significance levels (p < 5%).
For 47 we cannot reject this hypothesis and 16 cases are borderline cases (5% ≤ p < 10%).
The data strongly supports a population interpretation of the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Level of Number of
significance subjects
p < 0.001 89
0.001 ≤ p < 0.005 23
0.005 ≤ p < 0.01 9
0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 24
0.05 ≤ p < 0.1 16
not significant 47
Table 4: Mixing on an individual level or on a population level. Note: Significance levels are
based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for which we compared the distribution of 20 round prices
of each particular subject to the theoretical distribution of the corresponding LLE prediction.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The experiment provided a test of two different behavioral paradigms for markets with dif-
ferentiated products. In particular we investigated the performance of the Limiting Logit
Equilibrium (LLE) and the Undercut-Proof Equilibrium.
The overall evidence of our data speaks clearly in favor of Nash behavior and against
UPE. The mature behavior (prices of the last five rounds) matches the theoretical prediction
of the LLE quite closely. In asymmetric settings, firms with higher cost as well as firms
with larger consumer bases set significantly higher prices. This result renders the UPE very
questionable. Furthermore, while the UPE does avoid undercutting behavior by definition,
undercutting takes place and is quite similar to the predicted figures by LLE.
Further evidence against the UPE is provided by Orzen and Sefton (2004) who also inves-
tigated differentiated product markets. In their setup, subjects had to set a price repeatedly
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for 50 rounds with fixed matching. Their treatment varied in the number of players in the
market (2 players versus 4 players). The UPE predicts the same prices in both treatments
while the mixed strategy equilibrium found by Shilony (1977) predicts a lower price with
4 players. The aggregated data matches the mixed strategy equilibrium much better than
UPE. Moreover the equality of average prices in duopolies and quadrupolies can be rejected
in favor of the mixed strategy equilibrium (Mann-Whitney U, p< 0.001).
The analysis of the profit calculator data provides us with some although limited insights
to the way subjects thought when making up their decisions. The majority changes its own
price more frequently than the price of its opponent and this behavior was more pronounced
than for the opposite cases.
The interpretation of the results should not be mistakenly lead to the assumption that
individual subjects are able to find the appropriate strategy mixture in differentiated product
markets. It is rather on the population level where the mixed strategy equilibrium gains
explanatory power.
One of the reasons for getting the clear support for the Nash equilibrium might also be
the way subjects were paid off and the matching scheme. Since subjects only knew their
own exchange rate and not the one of others, any kind of social comparison was eliminated.
Moreover, the probability of being matched to the same person again in the following round
was rather low. Thus social preferences and reciprocity can hardly trigger the price setting
behavior.
Given the data, there is no evidence to support the idea of the UPE in our experimental
setting. However, we investigated this question only in a static setting. Our experiment
resembled a one-shot situation as much as this was possible. It is not clear, however, how
subjects would behave in a dynamical setting. The nature of the UPE makes it probably
more suitable for settings where the opponent can react on one’s price. As mentioned in the
introduction the UPE faces quite some similarity with the situation of a Stackelberg-leader
in a sequential game. In this case, however, the comparative statics do coincide and it is
questionable whether the UPE does better. Another dynamic setting could be the repeated
game with short run price commitments as for instance an alternating move game. Such a
case remains to be investigated.
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Appendix
A Instructions for Market Experiment
Dear participant, thank you for taking part in this experiment! It will last about 1 1/2 hours.
You will be compensated according to your performance during the experiment. In order to
ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask you to
follow the general rules during the whole experiment:
• please do not communicate with your fellow students!
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• please do not forget to switch off your mobile phone!
• read the instructions carefully. If something is not well explained or any question turns
up now or at any time later in the experiment, then ask one of the experimenters. Do,
however, not ask loud, but raise your hand! We will clarify questions privately.
• you may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• after the experiment, please remain seated till we paid you off.
• if you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have to
exclude you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
Your decisions are anonymous. Neither of your fellow students nor anybody else will ever
learn them from us.
The situation:
Suppose there are two cities each containing one producer. Both producers produce the same
product. Each city contains consumers who value the product at 100 ECU and will not spend
more than this value to acquire the product. Each consumer has two possibilities to buy.
Either he buys from the local producer in his own city or he buys from the producer in the
other city. If a consumer buys the product from the local producer, he simply pays the product
price of the local producer. If a consumer decides to buy the product from the producer in the
other city, he pays this producer’s price and additionally incurs a transportation cost of 20
ECU to bring the product from the other to his own city. Consumers will take the cheapest
possibility. If both possibilities are equally cheap then they buy from their local producer.
Each consumer will buy only one unit of the product (given that it costs him not more than
100 ECU in total).
Your City
YOU
(producer in your city)
6





*
Consumers in your city
The Other City
YOUR COMPETITOR
(producer in the other city)
6
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HHY
Consumers in the other city
® ®
You are the producer in one of the cities. Your city contains 60 consumers and the other
city contains 60 consumers. You face a production cost of 30 ECU per unit and the other
producer (represented by another participant in the lab) faces a production cost of 30 ECU
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per unit. Production costs are only incurred for the units actually sold. Your task is to set
a price for your product knowing that the other producer simultaneously sets a price for his
product. After prices have been set, the computer will calculate the number of consumers.
Consumers in both cities will choose their cheaper alternative and thereby take into account
the transportation cost if they buy from the producer in the other city (as described in the
rules above). From these numbers your profit can be calculated. The profit is equal to total
revenue (price times quantity sold) minus total cost (cost times quantity sold).
The relevant numbers above are summarized in the following table:
Consumers valuation: 100
Transportation cost: 20
Number of consumers in your own city: 60
Number of consumers in the other city: 60
Your unit cost: 30
Unit cost of producer in the other city: 30
The procedure:
In total, there are 20 rounds in this experimental session. In each round you face the same
situation. In every round you are randomly matched to another participant who acts in the
role of the other producer (he also has full information on consumer numbers and production
costs).
You go through the following steps:
• look at the previous rounds’ prices set by you and by those you were matched to (in all
rounds except the first).
• a profit calculator is given which allows you to compute your profit in different scenarios.
By typing in fictitious prices from you and the other producer you can simply try out
different possibilities and their consequences without commitment to a certain price.
• now you set the price of your product.
• look at the result and your obtained profit.
• a new round starts. You will be randomly matched to another participant.
Please, make your decisions carefully—your reward will depend on your performance during
the experiment. ECUs are transformed into Euros according to the following conversion rate:
1000 ECU = 0.3125 Euros
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Other participants may have different conversion rates. At the end of the experiment, we
would like to ask you to complete a short on-screen questionnaire.
Thank you again and good luck with the experiment!
Questionnaire
Please, answer the following questions! One of the experimenters will go round, check the
answers and discuss any problems.
Please fill in your subject id:
Question YES NO
Do consumers buy your product when you set a price higher than 100 ECU?
When you set your price below your costs, do you make a profit?
When your price is more than 20 ECU less than the other producer’s price,
do the consumers in the other city buy the other producer’s product?
Other participants may have another conversion rate from ECU into Euro.
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